




This is the author’s final version of the work, as accepted for publication  
following peer review but without the publisher’s layout or pagination.  







Link, P.M., Scheffran, J. and Ide, T. (2016) Conflict and cooperation in the water-security nexus: A global 
comparative analysis of river basins under climate change.  











Copyright: © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 






Article type:  Overview 
 
Article title:  Conflict and cooperation in the water-security nexus: a global 




P. Michael Link 1,2,3 
1 Research Group Climate Change and Security, Center for Earth System Research and 
Sustainability, University of Hamburg 
2 Institute of Geography, University of Hamburg 
3 Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, Center for Earth System Research and 
Sustainability, University of Hamburg 
michael.link@uni-hamburg.de 
Second author 
Jürgen Scheffran* 1,2 
1 Research Group Climate Change and Security, Center for Earth System Research and 
Sustainability, University of Hamburg 
2 Institute of Geography, University of Hamburg 
juergen.scheffran@uni-hamburg.de 
Third author 
Tobias Ide 1,4 
1 Research Group Climate Change and Security, Center for Earth System Research and 
Sustainability, University of Hamburg 





Adequate fresh water availability is an important factor for human security in many parts of 
the world. In transboundary river basins, decreased water supply due to local environmental 
change and global climate change, and increased water demand due to growing populations 
and continued economic development can aggravate water scarcity. Contrary to the claim 
that water scarcity may result in an increased risk of armed conflict, there is no simple 
relationship between freshwater availability and violent conflict. Other crucial factors need 
to be taken into consideration that also directly influence resource availability and personal 
human wellbeing. In this review, we assess the scientific literature on conflict and 
cooperation in transboundary river systems. Most international river basins are already 
jointly managed by the riparians but successful management in times of climate change 
necessitates the inclusion of more factors besides mere allocation schemes. On the basis of 
a substantial body of literature on the management of transboundary watersheds an 
analytical framework of the water-security nexus is developed that integrates the physical 
and socio-economic pathways connecting water availability with conflict or cooperation. 
This framework is subsequently applied to two transboundary river basins – the Nile River 
and the Syr Darya/Amu Darya – as they represent two world regions that could become 
future water hot spots. An improved understanding of the developments leading to water 
conflicts and their interaction can help to successfully reduce the risk of water conflicts in 
these regions and to move towards increased cooperation among the riparians of 





Water is of fundamental importance for life on our planet and a prerequisite for human 
development. The daily availability of drinking water is an essential human need and 
adequate sanitation is vital for human health and human security. Water is also an 
important economic factor as it is essential for agriculture, forestry, and fishing (Oki & 
Kanae, 2006). Rivers are an important natural transport mechanism for fresh water, often 
connecting regions of high rainfall with drier areas. Rivers provide drinking water for the 
population, allow the development of agriculture, and also serve the transportation of 
goods and people. Throughout history until today, rivers thus have had a special importance 
for human settlements and activities.  
 
In recent decades, the environmental and social boundary conditions of water use have 
changed considerably, making water a scarce resource in certain regions of the world and 
river basins even more essential sources of freshwater. Not only has the world’s population 
increased drastically but also the industrial and agricultural use of the world’s water 
resources has intensified considerably, causing the amount of water available to each 
individual to diminish over time. This trend is thought to be augmented by climate change, 
which is likely to lead to altered precipitation patterns and higher evaporation rates, thus 
affecting the overall water availability in river systems (Field & Van Aalst, 2014; Stocker et 
al., 2014).  
 
The problems associated with the utilization of water from river systems become more 
pronounced if a river system is shared by several riparian countries. If a country covers its 
water supply by using fresh water inflows from outside its own territory there is a 
dependence on upstream riparians. An alternative form of water interdependence is a river 
that is shared between two or more states along a border between them. There are 263 
transboundary river systems in the world, which are vital sources of water for 40 per cent of 
the global population (Aaron T. Wolf, 1998). Riparians have to agree on how the amount of 
water available in the watershed is divided, which is especially problematic if a river system 
is shared by countries with significantly divergent interests and a history of conflict and 
distrust.  
 
Unilateral use of the limited water resources may become a trigger of disputes and conflicts 
(T. Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012; Fischhendler, Dinar, & Katz, 2011). An environmental conflict 
perspective assumes an increasing conflict potential with water stress and is often based on 
theoretical frameworks that suggest that resource scarcity is associated with negative social 
effects (Aaron T Wolf, 1999). Although there have been numerous cases of disputes and 
tensions over the division of water from rivers in the past, violent conflict about water 
resources are by no means a necessary consequence of water scarcity or interdependence 
as the last interstate war over water dates back many millennia (Aaron T. Wolf, 1998). At 
present, “water wars” are not occurring and there is no indication that a war particularly on 
water is going to take place in the not too distant future. In current interstate interactions in 
transboundary river systems water is only one issue embedded in a multitude of issues 
affecting conflict or cooperation. Therefore, it can be a factor that drives conflict or fosters 
cooperation but it is not the sole reason for full scale violent conflicts. Rather than 
competing with other riparians, a cooperative utilization of water may provide benefits to 
all countries involved and could trigger further cooperation (Conca, 2002).  
 
This assessment examines how physical and socio-economic variables, including political 
and cultural drivers, interact to affect the likelihood and intensity of water conflict and 
water cooperation in transboundary river basins. Drawing on related strands of literature 
that are not sufficiently integrated, we develop an integrated conceptual framework to 
assess water conflict/cooperation that is subsequently applied in two regional case studies. 
This review starts with the dominant approach of empirically testing the statistical 
relationship between water stress and conflict/cooperation in transboundary river basins, 
including the most widely used definitions and data, and addresses some limitations 
(section 2). We discuss the relevance of climate change (section 3) and regional perspectives 
on transboundary water allocation in Africa and the Middle East, and in Central and South 
Asia (section 4). Based on the integrative conceptual framework of the water-security-
conflict nexus (section 5), we explore major pathways between water availability and 
conflict/cooperation in two exemplary regions (section 6). The key results of the assessment 
are discussed in the conclusion (section 7). 
 
 
2. Empirical results on transboundary water conflict and cooperation 
 
Empirical research in this field is growing but still at the formative stage. Much of the 
already existing literature on conflict or cooperation about transboundary water resources 
is based on statistical large-N studies. In contrast, other research that focuses on individual 
case studies or on simulation modeling is less frequent. However, these kinds of studies add 
different perspectives to the research on water conflict and provide insights that can very 
well complement the results of the predominant large-N-studies. 
 
Definitions and data 
 
Most quantitative large-N-studies employ very basic measures of water scarcity as the 
independent variable, which do not represent the temporal and spatial variability of water 
sources. Most basic is the Falkenmark-Index, which measures the existing renewable 
quantity of freshwater in relation to the population size (Falkenmark, Lundqvist, & 
Widstrand, 1989). With more than 1,700 m³ per person per year of renewable freshwater, a 
country has a sufficient water supply. Water stress is defined as annual water consumption 
of 1000-1700 m³ per capita, water scarcity below 1,000 m³, and less than 500 m³ implies 
absolute water scarcity. Regarding precipitation as a source of water supply, two indicators 
of meteorological water stress used in the quantitative literature are the Palmer Drought 
Severity Index (PDSI) and the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) that focus on deviations 
of rainfall from current and historic averages in an area during a specified period and 
account for excesses or deficiencies in the water balance (O’Loughlin et al., 2012; Theisen, 
Holtermann, & Buhaug, 2012). Most studies fail to distinguish between progressive (long-
term) or acute (shocks) scarcity, often using measures of scarcity that either have a low 
temporal resolution or are static (Meierding, 2013). Nonetheless, these static measures do 
have their merits as they provide initial information on the physical setting of a region with 
regard to water availability. Changes in this physical background usually occur on a longer 
timescale than changes in socio-economic factors affecting water use. Of course, dynamics 
in water availability also have to be taken into account in in-depth assessments of particular 
regions or river systems. 
 
With regard to conflict as the dependent variable, many definitions take a broader view by 
emphasizing the outcomes of conflict. E.g., conflict is conceived as “…the result of two or 
more parties (individuals or groups) having or perceiving to have incompatible goals and 
interests and acting upon these differences” (Hammill, Crawford, Craig, Malpas, & Matthew, 
2009, p. 2). This includes contention over both tangible resources (e.g. water, land), and 
intangible resources (e.g. claims to power or status), and does not necessarily require the 
use of violence as a means of conflict. However, many studies focus on violent forms of 
conflict such as armed conflicts (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 
2002) or militarized interstate disputes (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004) since it is more 
difficult to create good datasets on non-violent conflict events. Violent conflicts usually 
receive more attention from the news media, NGOs or scientific experts, which are the main 
sources for the respective databases. It is also harder to define the existence/beginning of a 
conflict or conflict event if no clear-cut quantitative threshold is available such as the 
number of fatalities (Day, Pinckney, & Chenoweth, 2015). However, Böhmelt and others 
(2014) have collected data on the apparently continuous dimension of cooperative or 
conflictive events over water. 
 
The Basin-At-Risk (BAR) event scale and dataset is another notable exception in this context 
and distinguishes between seven types of water conflict, ranging from verbally expressed 
discord to war (Aaron T Wolf, Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003). The most comprehensive dataset on 
water conflicts is the Water Conflict Chronology, which collected 265 entries of water 
conflicts from 3000 BC to 2014 AD. The chronology indicates a rising trend of mainly 
subnational conflicts over water, away from international disputes (Gleick, 2014). 
 
In general terms, cooperation is in place between two or more parties when they agree to 
take mutually beneficial action that would not occur without such agreement. In the water 
context, cooperation includes ”both formal agreements (such as river treaties) and non-
institutionalised forms of cooperation such as meetings between environmental ministers to 
initiate or foster joint management of shared basins” (Kalbhenn et al., 2012, p. 4). According 
to the BAR scale of conflict and cooperation, water cooperation can range from minor 
official exchanges to the voluntary unification into a state/nation. Quantitative research has 
most often used the existence of a (transboundary) river treaty, agreement, or institution as 
an indicator of water cooperation (T. Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012). The most prominent 
dataset covering transboundary water-related conflict and cooperation is the 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) (Aaron T. Wolf, 1999). A slightly 
different methodology is employed in the International Water Cooperation and Conflict 
(IRCC) database (Kalbhenn & Bernauer, 2012), which results in a larger number of recorded 
events than in TFDD over the same time period. 
 
However, it is important to note that strict conflict-cooperation distinctions can be 
misleading, especially if conflict is framed in negative terms while cooperation is judged as 
positive per se. Firstly, conflict can be an important catalyst of progressive social change 
such as democratization or a more fair and sustainable use of water resources (Mouffe, 
2005), while cooperation can obscure severe water-related inequalities or forms of political 
domination (Cascão, 2008). Secondly, forms of conflict and cooperation can exist in parallel. 
In such cases, cooperative actions can mask or even accelerate existing water conflicts and 
vice versa.  
 
Review of statistical studies 
 
While the literature is expanding, there is little consensus yet on the impact of water 
scarcity on social interactions, and significant deficits remain in the understanding of 
fundamental issues. In a comprehensive review, Johnson and others (2011) selected 47 
relevant studies investigating the relationship between fresh water scarcity and either 
conflictive or collaborative interactions. Of 19 studies exploring interstate interactions, one 
was related to freshwater scarcity while the remaining 18 were specifically related to 
transboundary river basins. Five of these studies investigated violent conflict and three 
focused on non-violent conflict, i.e. river claims between dyads. 
 
In this paper we give the reader a comprehensive overview of the current state of research 
and provide an up-to-date review of statistical studies on conflict and cooperation around 
transboundary river basins. Extending previous work, we conduct a systematic assessment 
and open the debate for the subsequent presentation of an integrative conceptual 
framework of the water-security-conflict nexus, which is exemplarily applied to the cases of 
the Nile River Basin and the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river systems. 
 
Cross-case studies exploring historical trends in transboundary water conflicts find that 
conflictive interactions are rare (Lucia de Stefano et al., 2010; Aaron T. Wolf, 1998; Yoffe, 
Wolf, & Giordano, 2003). Since 1948, supposedly 37 violent conflicts occurred, in which 
water played a major role. 30 of these conflicts alone were fought between Israel and its 
neighbors. On the other hand, there were 1831 “water-related incidents” in the past fifty 
years in TFDD, of which more than two thirds were of a cooperative nature (Aaron T Wolf et 
al., 2003). The IRCC database even lists 4797 events in the same time period but also 
concludes that most of the recorded events are cooperative (Kalbhenn & Bernauer, 2012). 
De Stefano and others (2010) find that between 1948 and 1999 and from 2000 until 2008 
there have been moves towards less cooperative interactions between some countries. But 
most negative events were rather moderate expressions of discord and hostility with little 
evidence of violent conflict. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the large-N literature on water and transboundary conflict. Similarly to 
the assessment of Johnson and others (2011), we found strong dissent in this literature. Few 
studies investigate the links between reduced precipitation or hydropower development 
and violent intrastate conflict, and the results are quite ambiguous. By contrast, there is 
agreement among the four studies conducted that low water availability increases the risk 
for interstate disputes, especially between neighboring states. However, when exploring the 
relationship between adjacent countries with shared rivers, only five studies claim that a 
shared river increases the risk for violent conflicts between states, while twelve studies find 
no support for such a link. Furthermore, robust treaties and institutions can mitigate water-
related conflict and facilitate cooperation even under hydrological stress (S. Dinar, Katz, de 
Stefano, & Blankespoor, 2015; Paul R Hensel & Brochmann, 2007; J. Tir & Stinnett, 2012). 
 
Despite evidence that water-related interactions are more often cooperative than 
conflictive, there has been a strong bias in water research on conflictive events. However, 
there are studies that find that signing of a water treaty positively influences future 
cooperation between the treaty partners (e.g. Brochmann, 2012), that water scarcity has a 
significant and positive relationship with the existence of river treaties (Jaroslav Tir & 
Ackerman, 2009), and that water scarcity enhances the incentives for riparians to cooperate 
(S. Dinar, Dinar, & Kurukulasuriya, 2011). When considering non-linear relationships, certain 
studies found a curvilinear relationship between the likelihood of cooperation and water 
scarcity (A. Dinar & Albiac, 2009; Ariel Dinar, Blankespoor, Dinar, & Kurukulasuriya, 2010; 
Ariel Dinar, Dinar, McCaffrey, & McKinney, 2007). This suggests that transboundary water 
cooperation is most likely if water is neither extraordinarily scarce nor abundant. The 
projected amplification of hydro-climates (Fung, Lopez, & New, 2011) thus has the potential 
to reduce international water cooperation. 
 
In sum, research largely indicates that there is little evidence that shared rivers per se 
increase the risk of violent conflict between riparians. Water scarcity, by contrast, seems to 
make violent interactions between states, including those sharing river basins, more likely. 
But this effect can be mitigated via well-designed institutions (Brochmann & Hensel, 
2011).More importantly, water scarcity is empirically more likely to produce treaties and 
other forms of cooperation, while water-related interactions in general are more often 
cooperative than conflictive. There is no convergence on the conditions and pathways 
leading to either conflict or cooperation. 
 
Addressing the limitations of statistical studies 
 
Without major progress in this field, it would be difficult to move from ex-post empirical 
analysis to predictions and forecasts (Thomas Bernauer & Böhmelt, 2014), in particular in 
the context of climate change. While data on armed conflict are globally available, there is a 
lack of adequate and comprehensive data across other levels of the BAR scale, and many 
studies rely on simple binary measures of conflict and cooperation (Johnson et al., 2011). 
Data at the subnational level are at times unreliable, especially for peripheral regions 
(Tobias Ide & Scheffran, 2014), and the results of large-N analysis are dependent on the 
statistical model used (Selby, 2014). There are also limitations with regard to the 
measurement of non-violent conflict or collaborative actions, e.g. because such events 
attract less media attention and are likely to be underreported in official statistics (Day et 
al., 2015). Consequently, researchers trying to investigate non-violent and cooperative 
forms of water interaction with a large-N methodology face several problems. This may 
explain the dominant focus on water conflict rather than on water cooperation in this field 
of research. The links between intra-state and international conflict or cooperation are far 
from being well understood as well, and international interactions about river basins are 
hardly considered as two-level games (Putnam, 1988). Similarly, there is need for more 
research into the intermediate factors between water availability and conflict/cooperation, 
including food prices, economic loss, symbolic disputes, public grievances, or elite 
manipulations (Tobias Ide, 2015; Meierding, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the currently dominant large-N studies can take into account 
important variables such as social constructions, perceptions and interpretations of water 
problems (Norman, Bakker, & Cook, 2012). The same holds for persisting inequalities, 
political domination, and hidden conflicts, which are masked as cooperation (Selby, 2003). 
Well-conducted case studies have a significant potential to produce innovative findings on 
these issues and are also able to provide considerable explanatory power (Zeitoun & 
Warner, 2006). Case studies could also regard transboundary interactions on river basins as 
multi-level and multi-agent games that are not only shaped by international factors but also 
by domestic politics, discourses, capacities, and power relations (Canter & Ndegwa, 2002; 
Feitelson, 2002). Such research could be inspired by a conceptual framework integrating the 
complex causal mechanisms and relationships between hydro-climatology, water flows, 
socio-economic conditions, culture, and institutional capacities on global and regional 
scales. In section 5, we suggest such a framework. 
 
 
3. Climate change, water security and conflict 
 
Climate change coupled with rapid economic development in many regions of the world will 
affect the dynamics between water demand and supply patterns as well as water quality 
(Schellnhuber et al., 2013). Adding to an already complex situation (L. de Stefano et al., 
2012), global warming may not only influence the physical water supply in a given river 
system but also affect factors governing water demand such as the amount of water needed 
for drinking and irrigation purposes (J. Tir & Stinnett, 2012). An increased average 
temperature generally leads to greater evaporation, which together with diminishing rainfall 
leads to soil degradation and declining river flows as well as reduced percolation into 
aquifers. Progressing climate change is expected to increase the frequency and amplitude of 
extreme weather events such as droughts and floods over the next century, which increases 
related risks and affects the capacity to adapt or cope with these changes (Field & Van Aalst, 
2014). When drier areas become even drier and moist areas even wetter the water balance 
deteriorates, possibly leading to regional scarcity or abundance of water resources (Fung et 
al., 2011). More intense and more irregular precipitation in short periods of time may lead 
to flooding, soil erosion, and large fluctuations in water levels of rivers. Many river systems 
are facing major challenges due to the melting of continental glaciers, which affects the 
water balance between summer and winter months and leads to increasing flows in the 
near future and to declining flows in the long run (Field & Van Aalst, 2014). Regions that 
experience recurrent water stress and are simultaneously sensitive to climate change 
include the Sahel, South Africa, the central U.S., Australia, India, Pakistan, and North East 
China (Hanasaki et al., 2008). 
 
The fact that the impacts of climate change will be spatially heterogeneous makes a clear 
distinction from the impacts of socio-economic factors difficult. Current disputes about the 
allocation of freshwater among countries are possibly aggravated by the impacts of climate 
change in the coming decades. The implications of climate change for interstate relations in 
transboundary river basins eventually depend on the link between water scarcity, conflict, 
and cooperation. Based on section 2, we cannot deny that climate change may increase the 
intensity or frequency of international river disputes. However, cooperation in the face of 
hydrological changes in river basins is still the more likely option, particularly if adequate 
institutional mechanisms exist (Brochmann & Hensel, 2011; Mianabadi, Mostert, & van de 
Giesen, 2015; J. Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Various approaches are suggested for “climate-proof” 
water treaties including adjustable allocation strategies and water-quality standards, 
response strategies for extreme events, amendment and review procedures, and joint 
management institutions (Cooley & Gleick, 2011). In general, climate change is considered 
to have a greater influence on patterns of peace and conflict within states (Gleditsch, 2012), 
and the link between climate change and intrastate conflict is complex and heavily disputed 
(Buhaug, 2015; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, Link, & Schilling, 2012). 
 
Considering the complex water-security nexus, debates about climate change may fuel 
concerns about future water scarcity, thus facilitating a securitization and militarization of 
transboundary water resources and eventually self-fulfilling prophecies of future water 
conflicts (Feitelson, Tamimi, & Rosenthal, 2012; McDonald, 2013). But in line with the 
environmental peace perspective, policy makers can also conceive climate change 
(independent of its “real” hydro-meteorological impacts) as a common threat that could 
facilitate collaborative mitigation and adaptation measures as well as trust, mutual 
understanding, and eventually reconciliation (Amster, 2013; Tobias Ide & Scheffran, 2014).  
 
 
4. Regional water conflict and cooperation in transboundary river basins 
 
More than a quarter of the world‘s population lives in water-stressed areas according to Oki 
and Kanae (2006) and more than one billion people have no access to safe and clean 
drinking water (Watkins, 2006), a number that is expected to substantially increase in the 
coming decades. Growing population densities and economic activities, particularly in urban 
areas, and changing patterns of water use are challenging the limited water resources that 
are available to humans (Arnell, 2006). The effects of environmental and social change on 
the net water availability are quite diverse depending on the geographic region and the size 
of the river basin. In the following, we will provide a condensed review of water-conflict 
linkages in selected regional hotspots where climate change interferes with local 
environmental and socio-economic factors that affect conflict and cooperation (Kirby et al., 
2010).  
 
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the world’s transboundary river systems and indicates the 
regions that experience physical water stress, which is particularly high in Central and South 
Asia, around the Mediterranean, and in parts of Northern America. It has to be noted that 
this physical setting is only one factor affecting the possibilities for conflict and cooperation. 
Also, whether a given amount of water available at a particular location is sufficient to 
support the population not only depends on the physical but also on the societal pressures 
on water resources, including conflict. Therefore, identifying areas that are exposed to 
either or both pressures – whatever the link between them may be – provides useful 
baseline information for the subsequent analyses. More detailed assessments of Africa and 
the Middle East and Central and South Asia area given below. These are not necessarily the 
areas with the highest physical water stress per se but areas, in which there are 
considerable interactions between the riparians of transboundary river systems. 
Consequently, these regions are particularly relevant with regard to interstate interactions 
that may be conflictive or cooperative or maybe even both simultaneously. The case study 
on Africa and the Middle East encompasses fundamentally different regions that have 
diametrically different dependencies on river water. Incidentally, the dependency on river 
water for livelihoods is lowest in the regions with low water stress in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Two additional maps are presented for each region (Figs. 2 and 3), illustrating indicators of 
physical water scarcity and violent conflict as one indicator of societal pressure (based on 
the ACLED and PRIO/UCDP databases). The maps rather visualize which of the regions are 
affected by either, none or both of these two pressures and is not supposed to suggest a 
causal relationship between them. Note that the choice of the two case study areas is based 
on the fact that the applicability of the framework presented in this paper can be readily 
shown and not to suggest that these regions are particularly violent with regard to water 
resources. 
 




Large transboundary river systems shape the African continent, the most prominent being 
the Nile, the Congo, the Zambezi, the Senegal, the Niger, and the Orange River. In many 
countries, particularly in North Africa, major parts of the populations rely on water from 
rivers for their daily sustenance. In general, the water availability in the large transboundary 
river systems of the continent is adequate as the physical baseline water stress is relatively 
low in most parts (Fig. 2). Areas with high water stress adjacent to large rivers are only 
found in the downstream areas of the Nile River Basin and in South Africa. It has to be 
therefore noted that the dependence on river water for livelihoods is much higher in these 
areas and resembles that of the Middle East than in Sub-Saharan Africa. To study the role of 
conflict, several conflict databases offering geo-referenced information on armed conflicts 
in Africa have been compiled and related to water stress in Africa. 
 
Conflicts are most numerous in areas with particularly high population densities that in 
many cases coincide rather well with the streams of the large rivers (Fig. 2). This points to a 
spatial correlation but does not constitute a causal relationship. The reasons for this 
development are manifold and include global drivers such as population growth, neoliberal 
economic development, and climate change. All these combined have an effect on the 
possible occurrence of conflict or cooperation. Consequently, conflict hot spots do not 




Besides the Nile River (which is analyzed as an exemplary case in section 6), there are 
several other important transboundary river basins in Africa that are also jointly managed 
by the riparians. Particularly in Western Africa there are successful water sharing schemes 
(Bhaduri, Manna, Barbier, & Liebe, 2011), e.g. in the Volta River Basin where transboundary 
water flows are linked to hydropower exports in the allocation agreement. The same holds 
for the Okavango River Basin where water allocation schemes can be used to avoid or 
mediate conflicts between the riparians (Hamandawana, Chanda, & Eckardt, 2007). This 
supports the notion that water management schemes in Africa should not only focus on 
specific water amounts but should be more comprehensive by also addressing issues of 
equity, sustainability, and maximum efficiency (Ashton, 2002). On this basis, well-structured 
agreements can foster cooperation through water interdependency.  
 
The Middle East 
 
For various reasons, the Middle East has been frequently cited as a potential arena of 
“water wars” (Amery, 2002). Parts of this region are characterized by an arid or semi-arid 
climate, an imbalance between water demand and supply, as well as already tense 
interstate relations (Shuval & Dweik, 2007). The region is also characterized by several 
transboundary rivers and a high symbolic relevance is often attributed to water (de Châtel, 
2007). Water interaction between Israel and Palestine regarding the Jordan River and 
transboundary aquifers has been intensively studied (e.g. Feitelson et al., 2012; Selby, 
2003). Severe water-related inequalities (Selby, 2013) and conflictive dominant discourses 
(Fröhlich, 2012) are the main drivers of the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict, which can be 
observed in parallel to patterns of water cooperation established by the 1995 interim 
agreement (Zeitoun, 2008). Disputes about the Jordan River also exist between Israel and 
Lebanon and between Israel and Syria (Zeitoun, Talhami, & Eid-Sabbagh, 2013), while 
patterns of water interaction between Israel and Jordan are largely cooperative, although 
tensions continue to occur (Jägerskog, 2007). Increased water availability due to Israeli 
desalination and wastewater recycling has the potential to lessen international tensions 
about water resources. However, no significant de-securitization has occurred yet (Aviram, 
Katz, & Shmueli, 2014). Conflicts about the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers exist between Turkey 
as the upstream riparian and Syria and Iraq as the downstream riparians (Harris & Alatout, 
2010). This conflict could possibly worsen in the future as Turkey continues developing its 
dam projects (Daoudy, 2009). 
 
Central and South Asia 
 
The river basins in Central and Southern Asia are all highly dependent on the supply of 
water from the mountain ranges of the Himalaya (Fig. 3). Nonetheless, the resulting pattern 
of baseline water stress in this part of the world is quite heterogeneous: there is substantial 
water availability in the countries directly adjacent to the Himalayan Mountains whereas 
water scarcity quickly increases with growing distance.  
 
In Central Asia, the water allocation issues in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya basins have 
become an important driver for tensions after the demise of the former Soviet Union as 
these rivers suddenly crossed the international borders of five independent countries. 
Climate change poses a particular challenge to the region as it tends to aggravate existing 
water problems and tensions (see the exemplary case study Syr Darya and Amu Darya in 
section 6). 
 
In South Asia, the economies and livelihoods of approximately one tenth of the world’s 
population depend on the water of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin (Rasul, 
2014). With this considerable demand, effective water management can only be achieved if 
the focus is expanded from merely the engineering perspective to encompass ecological 
aspects and hydro-diplomacy as well (Bandyopadhyay & Ghosh, 2009), particularly if 
changing climatic conditions in this region are considered. Such scheme depends on 
cooperation between the riparians, particularly if areas are closely interlinked like the 
upstream and downstream areas of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River. While studies 
stress the importance of cooperation among the riparians, there are actually very few 
reports that such cooperation has been realized (Sud, Mishra, Varma, & Bhadwal, 2015). 
Nonetheless, there are water treaties in effect in this river basin such as the Ganges River 
Treaty, which was signed in 1996 for 30 years (Pandey, 2014) and became a successful basis 
for cooperation on water between India and Bangladesh in the past decade. Efforts are now 




The case study literature confirms the general impression from the large-N studies that 
water scarcity can be a driver of interstate conflicts in transboundary river systems. 
However, these conflicts are rather nonviolent in terms of direct, physical violence. Also, 
cooperative interactions occur more frequently. Nonetheless, cases such as the Jordan 
River, the Nile River, or the Syr Darya/Amu Darya river system also illustrate that some of 
the cooperative events are rather superficial and occur in the context of distrust, structural 
inequalities, and ongoing conflict (Deng, Long, Wang, Li, & Lei, 2012; Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 
2008). This highlights the point that simple binary measures tend to miss the complexity of 
certain situations and that water conflict and cooperation should not be conceived as clear 
opposites. Also, several case studies emphasize the importance of the symbolic dimensions 
of conflicts over transboundary rivers while statistical analyses can hardly account for such 
factors. In the next section, we present an integrative conceptual framework that aims to 
bridge these gaps. 
 
 
5. Conceptual framework of the water-security-conflict nexus 
 
To assess the complexity of the water-security nexus, we develop a conceptual framework 
to explore essential linkages and potential pathways between the physical and socio-
economic dimensions of water availability and the institutional and political dimensions of 
water use, which may affect conflict and cooperation across multiple scales. This integrative 
framework assumes linkages between social and environmental change, its impact on water 
demand, supply and availability, linkages between water stress and (in)security, responses 
and interactions between key actors (individuals, communities, states), as well as the 
institutional setting of water management and conflict resolution. The chain of key 
pathways and effects can be represented by a scheme with three main compartments that 
relate to each other by causal linkages and feedback loops (Fig. 4).  
 
Systemic drivers and pathways of water availability 
 
In the first compartment, the supply of water in a given area is affected by physical 
dimensions and drivers, which are strongly dependent on the meteorological and 
geographical characteristics. These include precipitation patterns, evaporation rates, the 
existence of rivers and underground aquifers, soil characteristics (which influence 
groundwater recharge), or access to the sea (for desalination). All these are affected by 
climate and environmental change. Socio-economic structures and dynamics have an impact 
on the supply of and demand for water and on economic variables such as water-related 
investments and the market price of water, economic development and demographic 
change, the influence of extra-basin actors, forces, and factors, as well as water-related 
infrastructure and institutional settings. 
 
The balance of water demand and supply is shaped by relevant trends in social livelihoods 
and networks. These include population growth and the development of human needs, 
which determine total annual water withdrawal by all economic sectors in a given 
geographic location relative to the total annually available water flow (Gassert, Landis, Luck, 
Reig, & Shiao, 2013). There is a wide range of potential technical (e.g. dams, irrigation 
channels, and other engineering measures) and economic pathways (e.g. water pricing, 
availability and affordability of innovation, water subsidies for agriculture, international 
food prices, human-induced soil degradation or water management priorities) that have an 
effect on the overall water availability and determine the degree to which a given riparian 
experiences water stress.  
 
Evaluation of water stress and water security 
 
Whether water availability is seen as abundant or as scarce is subject to human values. The 
availability of water is perceived differently by various actors and often a source of heated 
political disputes (Harris & Alatout, 2010). Water also has symbolic dimensions. It is deeply 
connected to political and religious ideas such as purity (in case of the Ganges), national 
development (in case of the Mekong), or state building (in case of the Jordan) (Fröhlich, 
2012; Hansson, 2001; Jacobs, 2002). Insufficient water availability that is perceived as real 
can lead to severe value losses and risks that affect water security for vulnerable 
communities.  
 
Whether increasing water stress and dissatisfaction raise security concerns depends on the 
associated value perceptions, vulnerabilities, and security conceptions of the respective 
agents. The security dimensions in the second compartment range from human security 
concerns to national or international security threats (Zeitoun, 2011). Water stress and 
insecurity are potential drivers of human decisions and discourses, in which different 
evaluation dimensions and attitudes of stakeholders meet to adjust to and improve the 
situation by bridging the gap between demand and supply and diminishing dissatisfaction. 
Besides the utilization of water resources, their control can be disputed, especially when the 
symbolic value of water is considered high (Selby 2003). The literature of the water 
securitization discourse is full of examples in which the available quantities of water, 
promising water development projects, and/or the causes of water problems are heavily 
disputed between and among scientists, engineers, politicians, and local people (e.g. Mehta, 
2005; Murtinho, Tague, de Bievre, Eakin, & Lopez-Carr, 2013; Waintraub, 2009).  
 
Human responses and social interactions between conflict and cooperation 
 
In the third compartment individual and collective human responses are addressed as well 
as the social interactions they induce, possibly turning to conflict or to cooperation. Real or 
perceived water scarcity (or insufficient control over water resources) in combination with 
increasing levels of insecurity and securitization can establish an environment of anger, fear, 
or hostility, creating incentives to engage in conflict and eventually deploy violent means 
(Fröhlich, 2012; Stetter, Herschinger, Teichler, & Albert, 2011), potentially leading to a self-
enforcing cycle of violence. Whether conflicts related to water stress escalate or are 
contained may not only depend on motivational factors but also on the capabilities and 
opportunities to act, including the capability to fight and use force. However, there are 
several examples of water disputes which escalated into violence although one party was 
considerably weaker and perceived as lacking the capability to engage in violent conflict 
(e.g. Assies, 2003). In transboundary river basins, the availability of additional water, e.g. 
due to glacial melting or altered rainfall patterns due to climate change may cause conflict 
about which state is entitled to use the additional water. An increased availability of water 
can also make basins that were once considered as marginal more relevant for the riparian 
states, creating new water-related interactions that can be cooperative, conflictive, or both. 
It is crucial that motivation and opportunity are not only conceived as objective 
determinants of social action but as constructed by social interaction (T Ide & Fröhlich, 
2015). This highlights the relevance of securitization processes, the politics of scale (see 
below), and identity constructions.  
 
If the linkages described above do not materialize or are not strong enough, dissatisfaction 
about water availability may alternatively become a driver for innovation and cooperation 
to diminish water stress, e.g. by more efficient water use, new sources of supply, 
investments into water infrastructure, or water sharing (Sadoff & Grey, 2005). This not only 
depends on whether these options exist but also on whether they are recognized by 
stakeholders as options possibly leading to economic gains and a promising way out of 
water stress (Norman et al., 2012). In this context, the adaptive capacities for innovation 
and cooperation are of utmost importance. If the affected people do not take action, water 
issues may remain sub-critical and therefore do not trigger extraordinary responses, neither 
conflictive nor cooperative. 
 
Political institutions affect the impacts of water scarcity on the probability of conflict and 
cooperation. They influence the ability of states to adapt their freshwater needs by 
mitigating possible conflicts of interest that could otherwise escalate into armed conflicts 
(Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; J. Tir & Stinnett, 2012). Some empirical studies indicate that water 
scarcity increases the likelihood of peaceful third party settlement attempts or water 
cooperation while high water availability may reduce the need for river treaties and related 
institutionalization (see section 2). Adaptation options derived at the level of the entire 
watershed instead of country level can offer new opportunities to address the challenges of 
water allocation in transboundary river systems under a changing climate (Pelt & Swart, 
2011), fostering joint management and benefit sharing in transboundary rivers 
(Dombrowsky, 2010). Currently, most management agreements are only bilateral (Conca, 
2007; Mirumachi, 2015).  
 
Linkages in the water-security-conflict nexus 
 
In this adaptive framework of the water-security nexus, all compartments interact and are 
important to produce (perceived) situations of water scarcity or abundance, which can 
affect (violent) conflict or cooperation along transboundary river basins through multiple 
pathways. While the first compartment considers the underlying systemic factors and 
drivers of water availability, the second compartment transforms the systemic dimensions 
into human values and security perceptions that guide human actions and interactions 
towards conflict or cooperation in the third compartment. With this approach we clarify the 
black box between the physical dimensions of water availability (under climate change) and 
the resulting social interactions, including conflict and cooperation. This puts the value-
security dimensions at the core, with the demand-supply balance of water as an input and 
the conflict-cooperation relationship as an output. The transition between compartments is 
governed by the political setting, which represents institutional boundary conditions that 
moderate the interactions and are shaped by them as well. Water security and related 
discourses of securitization are influenced in a mutual way by the vulnerability to water 
scarcity and the vulnerability to conflict, irrespective of the causal relationships between 
water scarcity and conflict.  
 
The assessment of transboundary river conflict and cooperation is complicated by the fact 
that such interactions are deeply embedded into “politics of scale" (Norman et al., 2012, p. 
52). That is, all actions and ideas of international water interactions are based on certain 
scales (e.g. national, local, watershed), which can complement but also contradict each 
other. Patterns of river-related conflict and cooperation on multiple scales can thus 
influence each other. Discourses that conceive the nation state as adequate for water 
management tend to facilitate conflict, while a preference for the regional or river basin 
scale more often facilitates international cooperation (Feitelson & Fischhendler, 2009; Harris 
& Alatout, 2010). E.g., the Jonglei channel was an instance of cooperation between Egypt 
and Sudan (international scale) but facilitated conflict on the national scale between the 
Sudanese government and the inhabitants of southern Sudan (Mason, Hagmann, Bichsel, 
Ludi, & Arsano, 2009). 
 
In this context, the key issues can be phrased as questions to guide future research: Are 
changes in water scarcity strong enough to induce destabilization or even a cycle of 
violence? When do real-world actors attribute a loss in water value to another actor and 
does this provoke a response seeking compensation or revenge? Will a growing level of 
hostility turn violent at some point? How are intra-state conflicts at the micro or local level 
related to the national level and inter-state conflicts between sovereign states in different 
world regions? How will climate change affect the water-conflict relationship and the 
institutions moderating it? And how do these issues shape ongoing discourses?  
 
 
6. Case studies of the water-security-conflict nexus under climate change 
 
In the following we discuss two river basins in the context of the integrative framework of 
the water-security-conflict nexus for changing climatic conditions. The chosen examples are 
river basins in the focal regions in section 4 for which increased climate variability would 
add to the already existing water stress. 
 
Nile River Basin 
 
Water availability and climate change: Water scarcity is an issue in the Nile River Basin, 
which serves as the “lifeline” for an ever growing population experiencing declining water 
availability. In 2010, 232 million people lived in the Nile River Basin (Nile Basin Initiative, 
2013) and it is expected that the population in the basin will exceed 300 million people in 
2025. Egypt, which is suffering from population growth, rising food prices, and political 
instability simultaneously, is particularly dependent on the water from the Nile as more than 
95 per cent of the country’s water demand has to be met by using river water, and there is 
only little rainfall (Elemam, 2010; P Michael Link, Piontek, Scheffran, & Schilling, 2012). 
About 85 per cent of the Nile water that flows into Egypt originally stems from Ethiopia, a 
country with a population of more than 90 million people that has hardly utilized its water 
resources in the past (Arsano, 2010). However, the growing population and attempts to 
accelerate economic development in Ethiopia require an increased utilization of the river 
water resources. The same holds for Sudan. So far, Egypt could use Sudan’s unutilized share 
of the 1959 Nile water agreement. But with the Sudanese demand for Nile water increasing 
to 32 km3 per year by 2025, this is likely to further decrease the availability of water from 
the river in Egypt (Taha, 2010).  
 
However, the overall water availability in the Nile River Basin is critically dependent on the 
development of rainfall patterns in the Ethiopian Highlands that feed the Blue Nile. It 
remains to be seen how climate change will influence the amount of water in the Nile River 
Basin as climate models are still inconclusive with regard to the development of 
precipitation in the Ethiopian highlands (Stocker et al., 2014). In recent decades, the flow of 
the Blue Nile has increased while the flow in the White Nile has decreased, causing the 
overall flow to be more or less stable (Bushara & Abdelrahim, 2010; Kim & Kaluarachchi, 
2009). Additional uncertainties are related to the role of the Sudd Swamps in South Sudan, 
where a considerable amount of water evaporates from the White Nile. 
 
Evaluation and water-security discourse: The interaction of physical and socio-economic 
drivers leads to a greater uncertainty and thus an increased vulnerability with regard to the 
overall water availability. When political elites or the wider public perceive national security 
to be threatened by a reduced supply or an increased demand for water, they may turn to 
conflictive strategies to protect their interests. The affected population can pressure its 
government to take a harder stance in international river basin negotiations, thereby 
provoking water conflict (Feitelson, 2002). Human security can further be adversely affected 
by water scarcity if livelihoods are undermined by harvest failure, inadequate sanitation, 
high food prices or a harmful water quality (Deligiannis, 2012) as was the case in Egypt prior 
to the Arab Spring in 2011. The historic asymmetric development of the riparians of the Nile 
has complicated the interactions. Egypt has achieved the status of a hydro-hegemon mainly 
due to its considerable external support in colonial times and during the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam (facilitated by, among others, Soviet financial support) (Allan, 2009). In 
recent years this status has been challenged not only by the economic and demographic 
development of the countries further upstream but also by the possibility that the overall 
amount of water to be distributed in the Nile River Basin decreases.  
 
Conflictive and cooperative responses and interactions: Highly vulnerable countries may 
turn to unilateral actions concerning water allocation of the Nile, which increases the 
potential for conflict (P Michael Link et al., 2012). This development can be countered by an 
increase of the joint adaptive capacities of the riparians through cooperation. The 
construction of large dams in the upstream countries such as the Grand Renaissance Dam in 
Ethiopia further adds to the difficulties concerning the allocation of Nile water as it 
withholds an amount of water equal to more than one annual flow rate of the river from the 
downstream countries (Bastawesy, 2014). After completion of the dam, Ethiopia becomes a 
regional power in the Nile River Basin that may force Egypt to abstain from its hydro-
hegemonial status and to foster basinwide cooperation instead (Gebreluel, 2014), also 
benefitting from the concurrent weakening of the Egyptian regime. However, this requires a 
functioning conflict resolution mechanism that has the capacity to mediate conflicts among 
riparians (Wiebe, 2001). Furthermore, not all cooperative projects meet expectations: e.g. 
the construction of the Jonglei Channel was supposed to increase the water availability and 
deepen cooperation over the Nile between Sudan and Egypt. But inadequate consultation 
and the expropriation of land holdings from local populations intensified tensions between 
the population in southern Sudan and the Khartoum government, finally causing the failure 
of the project (Mason et al., 2009). 
 
On the other hand, there have been considerable cooperative efforts in the Nile River Basin, 
culminating in the founding of the Nile Basin Initiative in 1999. These have been 
considerably supported by external sources such as the U.S. and the World Bank who had 
substantial political and economic interests to support cooperation in the Nile region 
(Paisley & Henshaw, 2013). Under the auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative there have been 
many cooperative projects (cf. www.nilebasin.org) and negotiations to devise a Cooperative 
Framework Agreement, which has so far been signed by six countries and ratified by three. 
So despite the fact that there are bilateral disputes about water (e.g. between Egypt and 
Ethiopia), there are credible efforts to reach a joint management scheme for the entire river 
basin. 
 
Nexus linkages: The Nile River Basin is already challenged by a highly variable climate and it 
is unclear what the future effect of climate change will be on the water availability in the 
river basin. Even an increase in the overall water supply in the Nile River Basin may not be 
enough to offset the growing demand, which will place a burden on the adaptive capacities, 
particularly of the downstream riparians (P Michael Link et al., 2012) and increases the 
already high vulnerabilities to climate change in these countries (Brooks, Neil Adger, & Mick 
Kelly, 2005). The events following the Arab Spring have led to political and economic 
destabilization in countries like Egypt, which affects their ability to address water problems. 
Countries have to adjust by protecting their own interests or by cooperation. Particularly 
the arrangements between the key actors in the Nile River Basin (Egypt, Sudan, and 
Ethiopia) that have to be made once the Grand Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia is in operation 
provide chances for long-lasting cooperation in the region (P. Michael Link & Scheffran, 
2015) as fundamental agreements regarding the distribution of water and energy from 
hydropower become necessary. 
 
Syr Darya and Amu Darya 
 
Water availability and climate change: In the past few years, disputes over water use and 
energy production have increased in the Syr Darya/Amu Darya Basin between the upstream 
countries Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the downstream countries Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Siegfried & Bernauer, 2007). This has to do with the 
completely opposite patterns of water and energy use: As the upstream countries need to 
release water from reservoirs during winter to generate energy for heating, this causes 
floods in the downstream areas. And in summer, when water is needed for agriculture in 
the downstream countries, the upstream countries reduce flow rates of the rivers to 
replenish their reservoirs. Attempts to establish a functioning institutional setup that 
governs water and energy allocation in the region have so far been unsuccessful (T. 
Bernauer & Siegfried, 2012). Variability in precipitation in recent years has increased the 
pressure on water resources and stakeholders in the region as it is expected that water 
shortages will become more frequent in the summer months (Sorg et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, replenishment from glaciers could decrease in the future, making water 
management by sensible use of the reservoirs ever more important.  
 
Evaluation and water-security discourse: There has been a tendency towards securitization 
of water allocation issues in Central Asia (Sorg et al., 2014), which discourages coordination 
among the neighboring countries. Water interaction is further complicated by persistent 
national rivalries and frequent attacks against ethnic minorities in the respective countries. 
Recent attempts to address concerns for national and human security and resolve water 
allocation disputes that have arisen from the divergent seasonal requirements for water 
have mainly focused on technical solutions. However, the social and political dimensions of 
these issues should receive greater attention (Abdullaev, Atabaeva, & Algamal, 2012). There 
has been external pressure not only to become more irrigation efficient but to switch from 
cotton to food crops to enhance food security. 
 
Conflictive and cooperative responses and interactions: Talks on water allocation 
(Wegerich, Kazbekov, Lautze, Platonov, & Yakubov, 2012) are key requirements to reduce 
the inter-state tensions among the riparians which emerged in the past two decades. In 
addition to mere allocation quotas of water, a conflict resolution scheme would also need to 
address the issues of who gets the water, which rationale of water distribution and benefit 
allocation for water conservation projects is applied, and how to monitor and enforce 
agreements on water exchange (Deng et al., 2012; Karthe, Chalov, & Borchardt, 2015). 
There have been several attempts to design agreements between the five riparians since 
their independence in the early 1990s, even linking the issues of water and energy 
(Hodgson, 2010). But the current scheme of water allocation is still based on priorities set 
up in the Soviet era and there has been no success in the design of a new scheme that is 
based on equity (Sorg et al., 2014). One key obstacle is that there is no obvious advantage to 
all countries for cooperation, thus the situation is perceived to be only advantageous for a 
riparian when a development is at the expense of another (Mosello, 2008). Consequently, as 
there is no agreement yet that suits all countries, non-cooperation remains the common 
strategy.  
 
Nexus linkages: Climate change impacts in Central Asia are expected to manifest 
themselves through reduced precipitation and in conjunction with increasing water demand 
there is an additional necessity to reach an agreement on how to share the remaining water 
among the riparians (Sorg et al., 2014). However, the governance structures carried over 
from the Soviet era and the securitization of water have created an atmosphere of distrust, 
in which there is little room for cooperation (Bichsel, 2009). Furthermore, external pressures 
on the countries to increase food security or improve irrigation efficiency have a profound 
albeit indirect impact on the water resources as well (O'Hara, 2000). There are chances for 
increased basinwide cooperation but only if management schemes incorporate measures to 
reduce governance and policy obstacles for successful climate adaptation by means of cross-
sectoral integration and improved communication between stakeholders. 
 
 
Comparison of interactions in the water-security-conflict nexus 
 
Depending on the setting of the given transboundary river basin, the interactions of the 
stakeholders within the water-security-conflict nexus can vary considerably. The two river 
basins, to which the framework has been applied above, are compared in Table 2. In both 
cases climate change is an additional driver that adds to the already existing challenges for 
an equitable water allocation, which are based on historic developments in the 20th century. 
There are differences when it comes to current trust or distrust among riparians but for 
successful long-term management, the conflictive structures have to be overcome. Also, it is 
noted that the regions do not exist isolated but are embedded in a global economy in which 
governmental and non-governmental organizations and foreign countries and institutions 
also considerably influence the boundary conditions for cooperation or conflict. The 
greatest chances for stable cooperation are attributed to strategies that involve the linking 
of several sectors and consider the bigger picture besides the water sector itself (Gebreluel, 
2014; Sorg et al., 2014). 
 
 
7. Conclusion and outlook: From environmental conflict to environmental peace 
perspectives 
 
Transcending simplified relationships, this assessment analyzes water conflict and 
cooperation as a complex issue. The review first provided an overview of the existing 
definitions and datasets and the results of statistical studies. As there are many possible 
paths linking variables of environmental change to water conflicts, we looked at factors and 
pathways that affect whether transboundary water issues are resolved cooperatively or 
through conflict. Past conflicts not only featured a physical and a socio-economic dimension 
but also included cultural aspects, highlighting the fundamental role of water in people’s 
lives in all parts of the world. Climatic change, together with concurrent developments of 
growing populations, water-related inequalities, and economic development, have the 
potential of increasing water stress to critical levels beyond existing adaptive capacities. 
Consequentially, states more likely disagree about water use, distribution and control. 
Particularly in transboundary river basins, water-related conflicts often exceed the mere 
issue of which riparian gets which share of the available water. 
 
Research on the relationship between transboundary rivers, water availability, conflict and 
cooperation is still developing. To structure the existing research results a conceptual 
framework is developed that implements water security pathways and reflects the 
complexity and variety of water disputes for all possible spatial extents. This framework not 
only considers the physical aspects of water disputes but also incorporates the possible 
feedbacks between environmental and social change, the role of social structures affecting 
water demand and supply, and possible responses to increased water scarcity.  
 
A closer look at cases of conflict and cooperation around two transboundary river basins 
that are current or likely future hot spots of water-related disputes supports the notion of 
the complex interaction between physical and social variables in most water disputes. 
Despite the fundamental differences in water stress in the various parts of the world, the 
actual allocation of water is rarely the heart of the conflict. Usually, there are accompanying 
political considerations that manifest themselves in concurrent struggles over hegemonial 
status, the production of electric power, the distribution of water-related services, the 
maintenance of water quality standards, or the preservation of certain (e.g. traditional, 
nationalist or modernist) values. It would be naïve to think that transboundary water-
related conflicts could be resolved simply by making more water available (Bichsel, 2009), as 
demonstrated by the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict, where increasing water availability 
due to desalination and wastewater recycling did not facilitate conflict transformation 
(Aviram et al., 2014). This demonstrates that the framework of the water-security-conflict 
nexus needs to be embedded into wider political, societal, economic, and cultural structures 
and discourses.  
 
While the environmental conflict perspective identifies water scarcity and competition as 
drivers of sometimes violent conflict over shared river basins, the environmental peace 
perspective suggests that shared environmental problems (such as water scarcity or 
pollution) provide incentives for hostile states to cooperate in order to realize common 
gains (Conca, 2002). These different perspectives play important roles in most water 
disputes and have to be considered simultaneously to fully understand and resolve them 
effectively. Recent research activities into water conflicts have paid increasing attention to 
the social and cultural dimensions of the disputes, providing valuable insights to improve 
the understanding of this nexus in order to increase the likelihood of successful mediation 
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Figure 1: Baseline water stress in the world’s transboundary river systems (based on data from 
Gassert et al., 2013). Baseline water stress is a measure relating total water withdrawal in a given 
area to total available blue water. 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of baseline water stress in river basins and armed conflict events since 1978 in 
Africa and the Middle East (Gassert et al., 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Raleigh, Linke, Hegre, & 
Karlsen, 2010; Salehyan et al., 2012). Georeferenced conflict events in Africa are shown in dots; 
country-based armed conflicts in the Middle East are represented by shadings (technical assistance 
by Leonard Borchert). Note that the simultaneous occurrence of water stress and conflict in the 
same location does not imply a causal relationship between the two phenomena. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of baseline water stress in river basins and country-based armed conflicts since 
1978 in Central, South and Southeast Asia (Gassert et al., 2013; PRIO, 2011). Note that the 
simultaneous occurrence of water stress and conflict in the same location does not imply a causal 
relationship between the two phenomena. 
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Table 1: Overview of findings of research on the water-conflict link in transboundary river basins. 
 
 
 Nile River Basin Syr Darya/Amu Darya 
water availability and climate 
change 
Water scarcity is likely to increase 
because of population growth and 
continued economic development. 
Implications of climate change are 
unclear, which increases 
uncertainty in the region. 
Seasonal water allocation among 
the riparians is a key issue in the 
water disputes in Central Asia. 
Climate change is likely to reduce 
river replenishment, adding to the 
already considerable variability in 
water availability. 
evaluation and water-security 
discourse 
Egypt’s historic role as hydro-
hegemon is challenged by 
upstream riparians. Water scarcity 
can be regarded as threat to 
national security despite being 
brought about by non-political 
factors. 
Securitization of water has 
prevented cooperation among 
riparians. Management schemes 
need to incorporate more aspects 
than merely technical issues. 
Governance and hydro-diplomacy 
have received much less attention 
than water allocation. 
conflict and cooperation Dam construction is considered to 
be a threat to downstream 
countries. Nile Basin Initiative 
provides basis for basinwide 
cooperation. 
Attempts to devise a basinwide 
agreement on water (possibly 
even linked to energy) have been 
unsuccessful. Non-cooperation 
remains the predominant strategy. 
nexus linkages Climate change reduces adaptive 
capacities and increases 
vulnerabilities of the riparians. The 
Grand Renaissance Dam in 
Ethiopia necessitates new 
agreements. This is a chance for 
Decreasing precipitation and 
outdated governance structures 
have yet prevented the successful 
setup of cooperative structures. 
These would have to consider 
governance and equity issues as 
Table 2: Comparison of interactions in the water-security-conflict nexus in the Nile River and Syr 

























promote cooperation but 
also increase conflict risk if 















at various scales 
promote principles of 
equity, particular attention 







climate change conflict events 
related to water 
Water Events Scale records 
time, location, and 
intensity of water related 





country level climate change water allocation 
among riparians 
cooperation increases 
water availability for 
agriculture without losses 











water trade may increase 
regional welfare, which 



















water is only one factor 
influencing conflict in this 















climate change affects 
livelihoods mainly in 
remote areas and only little 














analytic framework is basis 
for a predictive theory of 








Strategies to advance 
riparians’ interests are 
long-term cooperation but can 
also end in a conflictive way. 
well as technical and engineering 
aspects. 
tes security issues reviewed and proposals to 
foster peace are examined. 
Hamandawa











application of a hypergame 
theoretical analysis allows 
the design of allocation 
arrangements to resolve 
conflict 
Phillips 2012 Jordan 
River 








riparians are likely to prefer 
unilateral action despite 
advantages of cooperation 
Shuval 2000 Jordan 
River 





in the context of 
the geopolitical 
setting 
possibility to account for 
security concerns and 
riparians’ needs in a tri-











water wars or 
water peace in 
its discursive 
context 
persistent discourse that 
there is neither water war 
nor water peace 
Wiebe 2001 Nile 
River 






water quality as 
driver of conflict 
among water 
users 
An effective NBI needs to 
devise an explicit and 
efficient basin-wide treaty 





























Water management shifts 
from technical issues to 
social and political aspects. 
Coordination of reforms 












a climate change induced 
militarized inter-state 























plans opposing water 
development measures 
create insecurities in 
people, increasing the 
chance of conflict 















resolution of water 
conflicts requires four 
fundamental tasks, linking 
water to energy issues and 
ecological and social 
aspects 
Kaiser Khan Ganges country level water upstream water integrated water 









technological progress is 
necessary for sustainable 
water sharing among 
riparians 
























extended food demand 
Onishi 2007 Mekon
g River 








China compromises with 















armed interstate conflict in 
the Mekong Basin is 


















unilateral development and 
diversion plans by China 
and India likely causes 













reliance on increased water 
availability to solve 

















may lift deadlock of 















assessments of conflict and 
cooperation need to 























and scheme of 
water 
management 
intra-state issues are as 
important as international 
ones when moving towards 
joint water management 






Assessment indicates that a 
model of collective 
cooperation and benefit 
reallocation is superior to a 
model of proportional 
sharing 






The authors would like to thank Leonard Borchert for valuable technical support and for the GIS 
work on the figures. Research for this paper was supported through the Cluster of Excellence 'CliSAP' 





DOI Article title 
10.1002/wcc.228 Current and future challenges facing transboundary river basin management 
10.1002/wcc.336 Climate–conflict research: some reflections on the way forward 
10.1002/wat2.1070 Water conflict and cooperation in Southern Africa 
 
Figure 1: Baseline water stress in the world’s transboundary river systems (based on data from 
Gassert et al., 2013). Baseline water stress is a measure relating total water withdrawal in a given 
area to total available blue water.  
 
  
Figure 2: Illustration of baseline water stress in river basins and armed conflict events since 1978 in 
Africa and the Middle East (Gassert et al., 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Raleigh et al., 2010; Salehyan 
et al., 2012). Georeferenced conflict events in Africa are shown in dots; country-based armed 
conflicts in the Middle East are represented by shadings (technical assistance by Leonard Borchert). 
Note that the simultaneous occurrence of water stress and conflict in the same location does not 
imply a causal relationship between the two phenomena. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of baseline water stress in river basins and country-based armed conflicts since 
1978 in Central, South and Southeast Asia (Gassert et al., 2013; PRIO, 2011). Note that the 
simultaneous occurrence of water stress and conflict in the same location does not imply a causal 
relationship between the two phenomena. 
 
  
Figure 4: Integrative conceptual framework of the water-security-conflict nexus. 
 
 
 
